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Justice in Rural China
INTRODUCTION
According to Zhu Suli, the dean of Beijing University Law School, the
rule of law has replaced Maoist revolution as the blind faith of the Chinese
masses. Like most faiths, its popularity rests on a fair amount of ignorance
and superstition, but Zhu is convinced that it will remain China's secular
religion for some time to come. To address that ignorance, to expose what
he considers vast gaps in the Chinese people's knowledge of their own
society and law, and to provide empirical and theoretical insights into legal
reform in modernizing societies, Zhu wrote Sending Law to the
Countryside: Research on China's Basic-Level Judicial System, an
empirical study of the lowest levels of the Chinese judiciary.'
Despite its origins in a Ford Foundation rule-of-law grant, the book is a
polemical attack on orthodox thinking on the rule of law and the direction
of Chinese legal reform. Zhu attacks Chinese legal scholars as enamored of
trendy Western theory and ignorant of the role of law in Chinese society
outside of Beijing and Shanghai. His critique and his colleagues' responses
provide a window into contemporary Chinese legal scholarship, but the
relevance of his analysis extends beyond China to include the entire rule-of-
law movement and the conventional wisdom on the role of legal institutions
in social modernization. His rhetorical style exudes complete confidence
despite data that might be considered selective and anecdotal, and his tone
swings from a preachy "I am more of the people than you" populism to a
pedantic combination of Western theorists from Foucault to Posner. In other
words, Sending Law to the Countryside is irritating and fun. It is also
important.
Zhu's call to China to emphasize its "native resources" rather than
Western models in building its legal system has been controversial within
China, where borrowing from the West is conventional wisdom. Unlike
many opponents of westernization, however, Zhu is neither xenophobic nor
romantic. He does not essentialize China, and he emphatically rejects
1. ZHU SULI, SONG FA XIAXIANG: ZHONGGUO JICENG SIFAZHIDU YANJIU [SENDING LAW TO
THE COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA'S BASIC-LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM] (2000). It is likely
that Zhu chose the phrase "send to the countryside" to refer to the practice during the Cultural
Revolution of sending intellectuals and other perceived opponents of Mao to the "countryside" for
reeducation. Just as westernized intellectuals were "restructured" [gaizao] during the Cultural
Revolution, Zhu suggests that the Western-based legislation of contemporary China is restructured
once it reaches the basic courts of the countryside. To call Sending Law to the Countryside an
empirical study does not imply that it is necessarily a rigorously social scientific investigation of
Chinese basic courts. Zhu never fully explains his methodology, so it is impossible to judge fairly
the rigor of his work. From references dispersed more or less casually throughout the book, it
appears that he relied on a mixture of direct observation of court proceedings, interviews with
basic court judges, and surveys. See, e.g., id. at 92-103 (explaining the methodology used in
researching the adjudication committee). Zhu does, on the other hand, describe in his final chapter
the political, financial, and personal difficulty of conducting empirical research in contemporary
China. See id. at 425-44.
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appeals to Chinese tradition, "Asian values," or guanxi.2 Thus, Zhu does not
resort to the usual tactic of rule-of-law critics-an all-too-easy dismissal of
Western law as unsuited to Chinese (or African or Latin American)
conditions followed by a hopelessly vague call for homegrown solutions.
Instead, he gives a detailed picture of how rural judges operate in particular
disputes; tries to determine what makes them do what they do; and reaches
tentative judgments about-which practices are valuable, which objectionable
but temporarily unavoidable, and which fundamentally inimical to ongoing
legal reform. Although Zhu never talks of the value of his research beyond
China, it is likely that at least some of the problems, practices, and
techniques of rural Chinese judges are repeated in poor societies elsewhere.
At its best, Sending Law to the Countryside gives us both an in-depth look
at contemporary Chinese society and a case study in legal modernization.
It does so, however, within the political limits of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) as set by the Communist Party. There is little attention to
the influence of the Party on the courts or, conversely, to the role of the
courts in maintaining the communist regime. Although the book is not a
paean to communist rule, it is virtually silent on the role of political power.
It is possible that Zhu's silence is a reflection of the general lack of
attention to power's role in legal scholarship everywhere, but it seems more
likely that he is deliberately avoiding the subject.3 Whatever his reasons, the
absence of politics from the analysis is a serious shortcoming that detracts
from both the academic value and the policy relevance of the work.
Part I of this Review summarizes Zhu's data and analysis and presents
his main arguments. With few exceptions, the descriptions, conclusions,
and normative judgments are Zhu's, not mine. Part II places Sending Law to
the Countryside in the context of comparative law scholarship. After
discussing Zhu's theoretical framework and his failure to deal adequately
with the role of political power, it relates the situation of Chinese judges to
the assumptions of the contemporary law-and-development movement and
2. Guanxi essentially means the use of interpersonal relationships for personal or institutional
advantage. As such, it exists everywhere, but China is often portrayed as uniquely dependent on
guanxi for social cohesion, and observers frequently use guanxi to explain social phenomena.
Pitman Potter, for example, refers to guanxi to explain the tendency of Chinese judges to favor
one party over another when actual bribery is not involved. See Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the
PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA:
INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GUANXI 179, 188 (Thomas Gold et al.
eds., 2002). See generally Thomas Gold et al., An Introduction to the Study of Guanxi, in SOCIAL
CONNECTIONS IN CHINA, supra, at 3 (discussing guanxi and scholarship about guanxi). Zhu, on
the other hand, rarely uses the term and never relies on it to explain social phenomena.
3. Zhu is also silent on the relevance of courts to social control in the Chinese countryside. He
assumes that courts already play a significant role in social life in village China and that their role
will increase. Whether this assumption is accurate is beyond the scope of this Review, but there is
room for skepticism. See Ethan Michelson, Causes and Consequences of Grievances in Rural
China 22-23 (Mar. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.indiana.edu/
-emsoc/Publications/MichelsonDickinson.pdf.
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uses scholarship on antidiscrimination litigation in the United States to
suggest that the role of law and judges in Chinese rural society may not be
as unique as Zhu assumes.
I. DATA AND ANALYSIS
Zhu begins with the 1996 story of a judge in a remote village of
Shaanxi Province. The county credit union had lent RMB200 [$24] to a
local farmer ten years before. Repeated efforts to collect had failed, but
under the aegis of a "Use the Law To Recover Loans" movement, the credit
union filed suit in the local branch of the county people's court. The
president of the court borrowed a van from the local authorities, gathered up
a policeman and a representative of the plaintiff (and the Beijing University
research team), and headed for the defendant's village. On arrival, the judge
and his entourage found a village cadre and, with the cadre in tow, went to
the defendant's home.4 The defendant had taken his sheep to pasture, but
the cadre volunteered to find him and bring him back. Although some in the
judge's party feared that the cadre would warn the defendant away, such
was not the case, and on his return the defendant invited the group in for tea
on the kang, the brick platform used for sitting and sleeping in traditional
homes in northern China.
Once all were seated and tea served, the judge opened the
proceedings-what Zhu takes great pleasure in referring to as "justice on
the kang"-with a statement of the defendant's debt and an inquiry into his
failure to pay. The defendant replied that he had no money and, in any case,
that he had heard that the government was forgiving all loans made to
farmers. The judge scolded the defendant for relying on such rumors,
referred instead to the "Use the Law To Recover Loans" movement, and
made a great show of adding up precisely what the defendant owed, which
amounted to over RMB900 [$109], once ten years' interest, penalties, and
court costs were included. At this point, the cadre abruptly intervened,
criticized the defendant for not paying his debts, and proposed a
compromise whereby the defendant would repay the principal and interest if
the other costs and penalties were forgiven. The judge acquiesced but
warned that he would be forced to bring the full force of the law to bear if
4. The village cadre [ganbu] is the lowest-level representative of the Party-state. Sociologist
Yan Yunxiang describes their original role as that of a "tyrannical 'local emperor' ruling the
village as the agent of the party state," but the economic reforms of the past two decades have
weakened the Party's control over resources and strengthened the hand of farmers, so that Yan
characterizes their current role as that of "prudent middlemen who negotiate between the state and
village society." Yun-xiang Yan, Everyday Power Relations: Changes in a North China Village,
in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF POLITICAL DECLINE IN
CHINA AND HUNGARY 215, 238 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1995).
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the defendant did not comply. The defendant demurred momentarily, then
borrowed enough money to pay on the spot.
5
As Zhu points out, the mobilization of judicial power in this manner
may puzzle those Westerners who believe that the PRC is all-powerful
within its borders. The Chinese Code of Civil Procedure anticipates the use
of compulsory process to bring litigants to the court and allows for holding
court off premises only in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore,
government policy has long emphasized standardization and
professionalization within the judiciary, from judicial dress to courtroom
procedures to education requirements. Frequent departure from this trend
demands an explanation, and Zhu considers several, including the village
background of many rural judges, the bureaucratic demands of local
government, and even the lingering effect of Mao's efforts to bring law
closer to the people. He eventually finds his answer in the dynamics of
institutional power. Judges hold court on the kang because they and the
state they serve are too weak to do anything else. If Chinese judges do not
bring the law to the countryside, the countryside will ignore the law, and it
is crucial to the construction of a modem state that the central government
be able to project its power down to the levels where the majority of its
citizens live.6
When the court president and his entourage arrived in the village,
therefore, it was an admission of weakness as well as a show of strength. It
did not erase the fact that the judge was a stranger in a tightly knit
community or make it possible to collect the debt by sending subpoenas to
the relevant parties, waiting for the default judgment to be served, and so
on. Nor could the cadre's sincere assistance be assumed simply because he
was at the bottom of the formal governmental hierarchy. The cadre derives
his power from the villagers as well as from the government, and the judge
knew that approaching him for assistance would bolster the cadre's power
within the village. Even with the elaborate entourage, therefore, the judge
did not come into the village holding all the cards.
For Zhu, it is the tenuousness of central government power in the
village that explains the meaning and nature of sending law to the
countryside. He does not see it as merely an attempt to collect debts or
strengthen the legal system but as a step in the projection of bureaucratic
power into the margins of Chinese society. Building the state in this
manner, however, is risky-it can fail and leave the state even weaker. It is
also, in China's case, deeply ironic. Seventy years ago, the Chinese
Communist Party built its power in the countryside, from which it
successfully isolated and eventually conquered the cities. That the process
5. ZHU, supra note 1, at 28-30.
6. Id. at 30-35.
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has been reversed, and that the Party-government is now forced to use
judges to establish its power in the countryside from a relatively secure base
in the cities, shows how much has changed in the last thirty years of market
reforms, rapid economic growth, and urbanization.7 For Zhu, it also shows
that the process of building a state that can reach the rural areas is both
incomplete and contingent.
Governmental weakness transforms judicial power. Once the court has
to rely on the village cadre, it has left the world of individual legal actors
envisioned by modem legislation-what Zhu calls the modem world of
strangers-and entered a community of enduring relationships where the
court and the plaintiff are outsiders and must depend on others'
cooperation. In that world, formal adjudication is impossible. Who will find
the defendant if he stays with his sheep? Where is the court going to get the
information-the evidence-needed to make a judgment? How will it
enforce an unpopular judgment? It is institutional weakness, therefore, not
tradition or rural values, that explains the judge's willingness to turn formal
adjudication into informal bargaining. Holding court on the kang is not an
expression of premodern romanticism but the contrary: an ambiguous step
in the direction of modernity and centralized power.8
A. The Judicial System
The informality of holding court on the kang notwithstanding, Chinese
judges operate within a bureaucracy that significantly constrains their
freedom of action, and much of the first section of Sending Law to the
Countryside is directed at two controversies related to the nature and
structure of the judicial system. First is the meaning of judicial
independence and the propriety of the adjudication committee, which has
been blamed for a form of collective judging where judges who hear cases
are often not the ones who decide them. Unlike most reformers, Zhu
mounts what he calls a "moderate but forceful" defense of the committee.9
Second is the nature of judicial personnel in rural courts and, specifically,
the suitability of former military personnel to serve as judges. Again, Zhu
disagrees with many of his academic colleagues not only in favoring former
soldiers for the immediate future but also in arguing that rapid
professionalization of rural judges, even if possible, would entail costs that
more ardent reformers do not foresee.
7. Id. at 35.
8. Id. at 36-40. Zhu uses Foucault to analyze the center/periphery power relationship
exemplified by this incident.
9. Id. at 143.
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1. Judicial Independence and the Adjudication Committee
Adjudication committees typically consist of about ten judges,
including the president, the vice presidents, and the heads of the divisions.1°
A case reaches the adjudication committee only if a judge or panel cannot
resolve it through consultation with immediate superiors. The adjudication
committee hears precisely the cases one would expect it to hear: serious
criminal cases, doctrinally complex cases, cases involving local institutions
or powerful figures or their interests (which means virtually all
administrative cases), and cases that are likely to be difficult to enforce
without (or even with) the imprimatur of the entire court on the judgment.
In practice, all controversial or important cases end up in the committee.
Even so, the numbers are modest: The committee reportedly hears less than
one percent of all cases and up to fifteen percent of criminal cases."
Once a case reaches the committee, discussion follows a set pattern,
with judges familiar with the issues usually talking first and the president
remaining silent until the end. Court presidents are usually bureaucrats with
little formal legal background who are brought in from other government
entities; going last can help disguise their ignorance. Equally important,
remaining silent allows the president to evaluate the discussion without
prejudicing it or influencing individual members' views. Although a
majority is all that is required, unanimity is prized, and the court presents a
united front for external purposes. Internally, however, everyone knows
who took which position, and if the case is eventually reversed, judges
taking a mistaken position face possible fines, loss of bonus, or even
dismissal.
12
When Zhu and his team asked whether the adjudication committee
should be abolished, judges recounted instances where committee members
had too little legal knowledge, where certain members had disproportionate
power, where the committee had succumbed to external pressure, and where
they had participated in decisions that violated their conscience. But not a
single judge advocated elimination. 13 They argued that the types of cases
10. Chinese courts are organized into separate divisions [ting] to handle cases falling under
different subject matter categories (e.g., administrative, civil, criminal, and economic) and to
enforce judgments. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO 252-53 (1999).
11. ZHU, supra note 1, at 103-06.
12. Zhu mentions one court where the judges had RMB50 [$6] deducted from their bonus for
each "wrong case." Id. at 106; see also RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 294 (2002).
13. ZHU, supra note 1, at 107. Zhu acknowledges that many observers will doubt these
answers, but he trusts the judges' candor and sincerity. Scholarly criticism of the system is well
established, and the survey team went to great lengths to put the judges at ease, so he does not
think they were intimidated. He admits that judges may have a vested interest in the status quo,
but the judges were quite critical about other aspects of the judicial system and in many instances
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now going to the committee are precisely those where bribery and
illegitimate pressure are most likely. Although they acknowledged that the
committee is useless when the court president is willing to be openly
arbitrary or when Party or government pressure is extreme, in ordinary
times the relatively open procedure serves both to constrain the president
and create a united front against external demands.' 4 The committee also
institutionalizes supervision, which can help limit corruption-it is cheaper
to bribe one or two judges than six or seven. Furthermore, the committee
contributes to consistency in adjudication within a jurisdiction, a role that
may be particularly important in China, where cases are rarely published
and legislation is often broadly programmatic in nature. Finally, the
committee compensates for the low level of professional sophistication of
many judges by bringing the specialized knowledge and experience of the
committee members to bear on difficult cases. 5
Zhu finds these arguments reasonable and also points to the more
mundane support the committee can provide. Most basic court judges serve
in small towns where they grew up and where they are institutionally and
personally dependent on other government officials they see daily. They
serve in a bureaucracy that is constantly urged to become one with the
people and that always demands professional devotion to the latest policy
goal, whether it is "using the law to recover loans" or "striking hard" at
crime. This is not an environment conducive to autonomous judgments, and
the lack of a jury, which can help American judges avoid controversial
decisions, exacerbates the situation.' 6 Zhu offers two stories to illustrate
how the adjudication committee can provide social and institutional support
under these conditions.
The first involves the prosecution of policeman Wang for the death of a
college graduate in a motorcycle accident.' 7 The decedent and two other
young men had been drinking and were joyriding around midnight. They
had run two consecutive police checkpoints, and when they approached the
third, Wang fired two warning shots. After the motorcycle failed to stop,
Wang fired again and hit one of the passengers (not the decedent) in the leg.
The motorcycle continued for more than a kilometer until it collided with
another vehicle and the decedent was killed.
Zhu claims that the law was clear: Wang had fired in the legitimate
cited precisely the same problems and advocated the same reforms as do academic critics of the
adjudication committee. Ifjudges were willing to take a critical stance toward these issues, he sees
no reason for them to be less forthright with regard to the adjudication committee. Id. at 109.
14. Zhu admits that the official rationale for the adjudication committee (to aggregate judicial
experience and research important or difficult cases) was a pretext to give the Party a systematic
means to control the judiciary. Id. at 94.
15. Id. at 110-14.
16. Id. at 122-23.
17. Id. at 127-31.
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performance of his duties, and there was no legal causation between the
shot and the subsequent crash. Circumstances, however, demanded a
response. The decedent had been the younger of two sons. The elder had
drowned not a year earlier. The younger son's death left their mother
distraught, and she demanded Wang's arrest. When the Public Security
Bureau refused to arrest him, she committed suicide in protest. That
inflamed the local population, who were already distrustful of the police
because of earlier instances of police misconduct and who, according to
Zhu, demanded that someone in authority answer for such a death. The
remaining family members then organized a sit-in by more than 200 people,
which paralyzed local government operations. The county Party committee
demanded that action be taken to restore order, and the prosecutor
eventually indicted Wang.'
8
A simple case had become a treacherous one for the court. A traffic
accident had been transformed into a morality play, and the law had to
respond on the same level. If the court followed the legal path, it would
offend the local population and incur the wrath of the local Party
committee. Nor was it solely an institutional issue. All the judges lived in
the area, and an acquittal would have meant not only social condemnation
but also danger to themselves and their families. As a result, referral to the
adjudication committee was a no-brainer. As it turned out, the committee
was unable to fully resist the dual pressures from the people and the Party.
Although all members agreed that there had been no crime, they found
Wang guilty and gave a suspended sentence of one year. As if to confirm
that there was no easy answer, the local Public Security Bureau then went
on strike for several days.' 9
Zhu's second case is a tort suit brought by a farmer who had lost a leg
while helping the farm secretary [nongchang mishu] bring a tractor across a
river.20 The secretary was legally responsible, but he was both recalcitrant
and judgment proof Because any judgment would be unenforceable, the
panel referred it to the adjudication committee, and the president took it
upon himself to resolve the situation. He arranged a package of relief for the
farmer, involving six local agencies, that included a job as a school guard, a
tax exemption for his fields, a bank loan to the defendant to enable him to
pay for an artificial leg for the plaintiff, and monetary compensation from
the farm and the ferry company. All of these maneuvers, Zhu implies, were
legally groundless, but they meant not only that all parties were fully
satisfied-the previously stubborn defendant cried with joy when he heard
18. Id. at 129.
19. Id. at 131 n.51.
20. Id. at 131-32. It is not entirely clear what type of office was occupied by the nongchang
mishu in this story. Because Zhu describes him as judgment proof, he was likely not the Party
secretary but only a low-level clerk.
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the news-but also that the court could avoid the loss of prestige that would
have resulted from an unenforceable judgment.
Zhu sees both these cases as illustrative of the constructive role the
committee can play. Legal reformers who might interpret the first case as a
failure of judicial independence would be making the fundamental mistake
of importing foreign norms without realizing that the social and institutional
resources that support judicial independence in the West do not exist in
rural China.2 1 The basic courts are deeply dependent on local government,
which controls their budgets, their personnel (judges are local civil
servants), the courthouse and judicial offices, and even the judges' housing.
But it was not solely the courts' lack of fiscal and bureaucratic autonomy
that were in play; social and moral norms were also involved. A wrong had
been done by the government; it had to be redressed, and rural Chinese have
little patience for legal justifications or judgment-proof defendants.
In these circumstances, individual judges cannot be expected to
withstand strong pressure. The adjudication committee has a better shot, if
not at rigidly enforcing applicable statutes then at least at successfully
defusing social tensions. As we see with the first example, the committee
cannot stand up to determined pressure, but that is not to say that in slightly
different circumstances the committee might not have been able to acquit
the policeman or that the result might not have been worse without the
committee's intervention. In the second example the contribution is less
speculative. Junior judges could not have achieved the success of the
president, and it was precisely his nonlegal experience and relationships
that made the outcome possible. It is through such settlements that the court
gains social recognition and bureaucratic clout, and the capacity to achieve
such results demands a powerful entity (the adjudication committee) or
official (the president) whenever resolution requires more than mediating
between the parties. Rather than being condemned as violations of judicial
independence, these interactions should be seen as judicial techniques
necessary to resolve contentious disputes and maintain social stability."
Recognizing the need for the adjudication committee's role does not
mean that the committee performs satisfactorily, however. On the contrary,
China's empirical reality should be a guide to effective reform of the
adjudication committee in particular and of the bureaucratic flaws of the
judiciary in general. For the former, Zhu claims that in today's rural courts,
a reformed committee could contribute to judicial independence. True
judicial independence may eventually require the committee's elimination,
but in the meantime, no theoretical abstraction can overcome existing social
realities. On the pervasive bureaucratization of the judiciary, the key is
21. Id. at 136; see also id. at 140.
22. Id. at 131.
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eliminating the rigid hierarchy within the courts, separating administration
from adjudication, and granting courts a degree of autonomy from local
governments. Once social conditions change, the market transforms rural
society, and judges' professional standards improve, the adjudication
committee may no longer be desirable. In the meantime, it should be
strengthened so that it can perform its legitimate roles more effectively.
2 3
2. Who Makes a Good Basic Court Judge?
Another controversial position has been Zhu's defense of the use of
former military personnel as basic court judges. As one would expect of an
institution that has grown manyfold in twenty years, the Chinese judiciary
is a mixed lot, and judges' level of technical competence is a major obstacle
to the development of the rule of law in China. At least through the 1990s
judges overwhelmingly came from nonlegal backgrounds and included
many former military and police officers with little training for their judicial
roles. The situation is changing, and newly appointed judges in urban or
suburban areas are likely to be legally trained at some level, but the pace of
and necessity for change remains a contentious issue.
The most prominent advocate of rapid professionalization has been
Zhu's Beijing University colleague He Weifang, who argues that the role of
China's courts has evolved in the last thirty years from an instrument of the
dictatorship of the proletariat to a professional institution responsible for the
resolution of disputes and the provision of justice.24 While a celebration of
the hard work and discipline of military personnel may have been
appropriate to the judicial role of the 1970s, continuing to emphasize
personal qualities hinders the development of the judiciary and impedes the
establishment of the rule of law in China. Zhu agrees that a legally
sophisticated judiciary is important and that the importation of untrained
military officers is inconsistent with the ultimate goals of the Chinese legal
system, but he disagrees on both the possibility of and the need for judicial
professionalization in the immediate future. Part of the disagreement comes
from Zhu's stress on the distinctive nature of the work of basic court
judges, part from his appraisal of the likelihood of professionally trained
personnel accepting positions in local courts, and part from a different
appreciation of the personal abilities and attitudes of former military
23. Id. at 140-45.
24. He Weifang's criticism did not go unnoticed. His article, He Weifang, Fuzhuan junren
jinfayuan [Demobilized Soldiers in the Courts], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Jan.
2, 1998, available at http://mylaw.myrice.com/fali/faliOO30-heweifang.htm, became a political
issue, and Southern Weekend was forced to apologize and immediately write an article praising
the use of officers, see LUBMAN, supra note 10, at 256-58.
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officers as compared to the alternatives. 25
As seen in the next Section, Zhu argues that the role played by basic
court judges in rural society is fundamentally different from that assumed
by most rule-of-law reformers and legal academics, and he is deeply
skeptical that Chinese law schools prepare their graduates for service at this
level. Despite his status as dean of China's leading law school and an
eminent insider in the world of legal education, Zhu's litany of complaints
about legal education is unrelenting: an exaggerated emphasis on legal
reasoning at the cost of fact-finding and investigation, a curriculum more
suited to advanced urban economies than rural societies, and a stress on
neutrality and process when the job frequently requires proactive
intervention to help the weaker party. The result is a very poor fit between
university legal education and the needs of basic courts.26 Although he
admits that the few university graduates he encountered in the basic courts
were successful, he claims that law school graduates have been conditioned
to want a type of work they will seldom find in the rural courts. It is natural
for them to want to find buyers for their talents, and the residents of village
China are not in the market for the narrowly legal knowledge and skill that
law school graduates possess.27
For Zhu, therefore, the relevant question is what kinds of substitutes for
professional jurists can best resolve disputes in a way that satisfies the
contradictory demands of basic court judges' many masters: the parties
before it, other residents, local government agencies, and the judicial
hierarchy. This task requires skills that more resemble the talents of a
generalized administrator like the county magistrate of imperial China28 or
an American justice of the peace than those of the professional judge. Zhu
finds justices of the peace attractive because they are drawn from the pool
of respected local citizens and have the necessary local sensibility. In the
case of contemporary Chinese courts, however, local connections come
with heavy baggage. One of the overriding issues in Chinese civil justice is
the tendency of the courts to protect their own financial and social well-
being by favoring local interests, and one of the central government's most
25. ZHU, supra note 1, at 322-86.
26. The disjuncture between Zhu's contemptuous portrayal of legal education and his own
role in shaping it is striking. One wonders why his own law school continues to fail to address the
needs of the legal system as he sees them. If he believes that Beijing University graduates will
never go to rural courts because the incentives are inadequate, why not advocate for enhancing the
stature of basic courts? If he believes that Beijing graduates are too urbanized for the basic courts,
why not admit more rural Chinese? Of course, Zhu is not writing a prescription for the reform of
legal education, but the incongruity between his dismissive tone and his position of influence in
Chinese legal education makes these questions unavoidable.
27. See ZHU, supra note 1, at 369, 369-76 (discussing one university graduate working in a
basic court who declared that he would "return all he learned in university to his teacher" because
it was of no value to him professionally).
28. Id. at 380.
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pressing problems is the vast gap in sophistication and technical knowledge
between the coastal cities and the rural interior. For this reason, judicial
reformers face a perplexing choice: Transferring local bureaucrats to the
courts would exacerbate local protectionism, might weaken any check on
abuse by local cadres, and would do nothing to bring rural villages closer to
the modem world. Bringing in outsiders on the model of the imperial
magistrate, however, might sacrifice the local knowledge necessary to
resolve disputes effectively.
For Zhu at least, former military officers are part of the answer. Like
local bureaucrats, they have ties to the area and can understand the
population's values and needs, but they also have three characteristics that
may help courts resist local pressures. First, during their military service
their personal networks and allegiances weaken and are replaced by an
openness to strangers and new ideas that may be rare among local officials.
Their relative lack of local connections also makes them more dependent on
the court. Transferees from other parts of the bureaucracy, by contrast, have
institutional ties that dilute their loyalty to the court and give them more
incentives and resources to resist court discipline. Second, the military is
largely a merit-based organization, and its officers are more likely to have
succeeded in a competitive environment than most local officials. Third,
they are more devoted to their jobs. After years of military service, they
have to start from scratch in a new environment and are eager to learn new
skills. By contrast, local bureaucrats often consider transfer to a court as
just another step in their careers as local officials, a way station or even a
demotion rather than a new vocation. 2
9
For these reasons, Zhu believes that the best alternative for rural courts
in the short-to-medium term is to continue to accept military officers. Zhu
emphatically agrees with He Weifang that the judiciary must be
professionalized in the long term. Until that point, however, an effective
judiciary cannot be built on Western models. It makes no sense to impose a
highly professional judiciary on a society that neither needs one nor is ready
to accept its modem premises and values. In thinking about rural courts,
therefore, Zhu urges his colleagues and the government not to start with the
image of what a judge needs to know but to ask what rural society and
grass-roots communities need. Knowledge is useful only when it can be
used to address a specific problem. The day will come when rural societies
need the knowledge and technical skills of professional judges, but the
timing should depend on the needs of rural residents, not on the hopes of
legal reformers.
29. Id. at 348-55.
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B. Judicial Knowledge and Techniques
Zhu's second section continues the themes of the first, including the
inadequacy of Western models for Chinese reforms and the gap between
China's modem legislation and the customs and traditions of rural villages,
but it shifts the focus from institutional structure to the specific techniques
that judges use to resolve disputes. To illustrate his points, Zhu again uses
case narratives, two of which I repeat here. I then look at the distance
between rural society and the formal legal system and the strategies and
tactics used by basic court judges to bridge the gap.
1. Two Judicial Narratives
a. The Field Ox Case
In 1984 farmer A borrowed RMB300 [$36] from his neighbor farmer B
and purchased a field ox for RMB600 [$72]. 30 Three years later, B's ox
died, and for the next nine years A allowed B to use A's ox without further
payment by the latter. During that time, A traded or sold several oxen
without objection from B. In 1995 one of these oxen calved, and in 1996 A
sold the calf for RMB 1000 [$121]. In none of these transactions did A
either inform B beforehand or give him any of the proceeds. One month
after the sale of the calf, B came to A's house and said that he needed an ox
for plowing. B took an ox and sold it for RMB1400 [$169] without A's
knowledge. Thereafter A sued B for the entire amount, on the basis that
their original deal had created a financial arrangement known locally as
dahuo that gave B usufruct rights in the ox but made A the sole owner. B
countered that their arrangement was a partnership and that he deserved part
of the proceeds.
The trial judge found a partnership but gave B only RMB360 [$43]
because he had failed to pay any of the partnership expenses. B appealed.
The intermediate people's court found the facts to be unclear and remanded
to the trial court with instructions to determine whether B had purchased
partial ownership of the ox or solely a usufruct right and whether the parties
had set a price or what the market price had been. On remand, the trial
court, this time sitting as a panel, declared the ox jointly owned property
and increased B's share to RMB650 [$79] without taking any further
evidence or giving any reason for this particular division of the proceeds.
Farmer A expressed dissatisfaction, but neither party appealed.3 1
For Zhu this is a simple case. The parties agreed on the only facts
30. Id. at 201-04.
31. Id. at 203.
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relevant to resolving the dispute: Both had invested a significant sum at the
beginning, and B had paid nothing thereafter. Anyone using common sense,
intuition, a sense of justice, or reason would reach the same conclusion-A
deserved more from the sale than B. Neither legal rules nor legal
professionals were necessary to figure this out. Only a law professor
pursuing the "legal essence" of the parties' rights in the ox would have
difficulty with this case. As for the courts' finding of a partnership, it had
nothing to do with the law, facts, or the parties' intent. A and B were
partners because partnership [hehuo] was codified in the civil law and
dahuo was not.32 Similarly, the amount of the award was entirely within the
discretion of the judges. In this instance, the panel on remand knew that
they would have to "give the appellate judges some face," 33 so they
increased the amount, but there was nothing in the law guiding their choice.
Cases like this rest on practical choices, not legal technique, and Zhu claims
that everyone "from Roberto Unger to Richard Posner" would agree that
legal reasoning is merely a specialized form of practical wisdom.34 Only a
believer in Dworkin's "right answer" would think otherwise.35 It would not
matter how extravagantly legal professionals analyzed the case or whether
they cited Holmes or Rawls, Lord Denning or von Jhering; the answer
would always be within the discretion of the judges.
b. The Irate Husband Case
In the second case, wife W and neighbor N had an affair while husband
H was working in the city. 36 The husband returned, discovered the
relationship, and threatened N and his family, claiming that the incident had
made it impossible for him to live in the village. The village committee
tried to mediate, and N offered H RMB7000 [$846], but H refused and
continued to threaten N, who, at the suggestion of the village secretary, then
filed suit for an injunction against the threats. H counterclaimed for
RMB 10,000 [$1208]. The court ordered N into "protective" custody in the
village jail and, after much cajoling and threatening of both sides,
eventually mediated a settlement by which N, after spending thirteen days
in the local jail, paid H RMB8000 [$967]. Because adultery is not a crime,
and because H had persistently threatened physical harm to N and his
family, there was no basis for either the neighbor's detention or for the
RMB8000 payment. Nonetheless, everyone was satisfied with the result,
and there was no further legal action.
32. Id. at 210.
33. Id. at 204.
34. Id. at 204 n.9.
35. Id. at 204.
36. Id. at 241-53.
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Zhu spends some time detailing the judges' handling of the case.
Despite the legal norms supporting the neighbor's position, the court could
neither accept his request for an injunction nor ignore H's groundless
demand for compensation. Instead, the judges took the contradictory course
of persuading the neighbor to accept short-term incarceration while
simultaneously calming H down to the point where he would accept a
reasonable amount of compensation and promise to leave N and his family
alone. Throughout this process, the judges never considered using the
statutory law as the normative basis for an agreement, but that did not mean
that the law was not useful, as the following ex parte exchanges between
judges and the parties illustrate. One judge said to H,
I understand your feelings and the reasons for your excessive
behavior... You have been emotionally assaulted and your
reputation damaged.... [N] should give you some compensation,
but things have reached an intolerable point. Think it over. You
can't ask for too much or act unreasonably. In this situation,
RMB10,000 is high. Think about it carefully and remember that
your wife was also in the wrong. Now that [N] has brought the
matter to this court, you should not bother him any more. If you act
excessively again, the law will punish you. 37
At the end of the process, the judge assured H that "[t]he law has been
carried out and [N] has been legally punished,, 38 although of course the
only legal violation had been H's own threats to N and his family.
The judges treated the law in the same loose manner in dealing with N.
One judge said to N,
You shouldn't blame the other side . . , you started the whole
thing. It is on your shoulders because you broke the law. You have
severely affected another person's family and the couple's
emotional relationship, and you've hurt society. You should look at
your behavior from the point of view of breaking the law, look at
the results-the responsibili, is yours and that makes your illegal
behavior even more serious.
3
Zhu characterizes the judges' behavior in these encounters as "lawless,"
but, as he is quick to add, not in a derogatory sense. 4) The majority of
Chinese, indeed even the adulterer himself, would likely have thought that a
serious wrong had been committed and that "the law" should vindicate the
husband's rage and repair the damage to village society.
37. Id. at 246.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id.
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In both these cases, basic court judges ignored or distorted statutory
norms to reach a decision that would accord with village morality.
Although in the Field Ox Case the panel on remand had to deal with an
attentive appellate court, the positive law was not a guide to the ultimate
resolution; in the adultery case the settlement went directly counter to the
law. Zhu does not interpret either of these two stories as the triumph of
substantive justice, however, with law functioning only as a deus ex
machina to threaten bewildered peasants into submission. As we see in the
next two Subsections, he uses these (and other) stories to illustrate the
techniques and strategies that judges have developed to bridge the gap
between the formal norms and procedures of the legal system and the social
conditions of rural China.
2. Caught Between Society and Law
Zhu portrays basic court judges as beholden to two contradictory
worlds, both of which are changing fast: the urban world of strangers and
arm's-length dealings and the village world of enduring and multilevel
personal relationships, where everyone knows each other and where there is
no such thing as an arm's-length deal. Every dispute, even one as seemingly
commercial as the Field Ox Case, threatens to bring into play social
networks that have developed over generations, and every possible
resolution threatens to affect the social fabric of the community. Zhu does
not, however, consider these to be two wholly independent systems. Urban
China does not float abstractly over the countryside. Basic court judges do
not mediate between two separate and static systems in a recapitulation of
the way colonial judges were supposed to discover native customary law
and apply it within the metropolitan system as a kind of foreign law. Basic
court judges are agents of the central government acting to bring the state's
authority to the villages, but they are agents with limited power who must
devise means to survive personally and institutionally in a setting that is not
ready to accept national authority and in the face of national norms drafted
41
with indifference to the varieties of behavior the judges encounter.
To illustrate the gap between village life and urban law, Zhu contrasts a
hypothetical dispute over the purchase of steel products to the Field Ox
Case. The former is easy to resolve because of a variety of features that are
absent in Chinese villages. First, the relationship is wholly commercial, and
the parties have alternatives. Second, property rights are, by definition,
clear. If the parties did not know their relative rights, there would not have
been a deal. Third, the interests involved are prospective, unrelated to daily
necessities, and easy to quantify. Fourth, again by definition, modem
41. Id. at 216-22.
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commercial activities are specialized and standardized-otherwise, market
competition would be impossible-and dispute resolution processes can
rely on such standardization. Fifth, urban Chinese are comfortable with the
significance of documents and their potential impact on their interests.
Finally, there exist interlocking institutions like banks, insurance
companies, and corporations that structure and reduce the risk of
commercial activities and standardize their procedures. As a result, a court
can readily identify the legally relevant behaviors and relate them to legally
42determined consequences.
By contrast, rural disputes have none of these characteristics. As
relatives or neighbors, parties to rural disputes are situated in a web of
obligations and expectations that constrains the bargaining process and
narrows the range of acceptable outcomes. The nature of rural markets
limits bargaining in another way. Competitors are scarce and the
standardization of goods and services has not progressed far enough to
provide alternatives. The result is dealings that should not be forced into
legal categories meant for transactions between parties who are conscious
of legal ramifications and who have multiple options in forming economic
relationships. The parties to the Field Ox Case, for example, likely never
had a clear idea of who "owned" the ox, much less the legal niceties of
partnership versus dahuo. These ambiguities and complexities are
compounded by a lack of documentation.43 Weber long ago noted that the
rule of law depends on written records to perform two functions: to
standardize transactions and to provide reliable evidence."4
Even in a static society with adequate resources, these conditions would
present problems, but Chinese rural society is changing rapidly, and the
basic courts face a dire lack of resources. As a consequence, for the
foreseeable future law will be a creature of commerce and of the cities,
where events and actions are more readily understood in terms of legal
categories, where there is more probative evidence available, and where the
economic importance of disputes justifies the expenditure of significant
judicial resources. Zhu does not mean that rural Chinese consider the
ramifications of their actions less thoroughly than urban Chinese or that
42. Id. at 219. Although Zhu cites Stewart Macaulay's classic article, Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963), to
demonstrate that he is not as naive as he seems, ZHU, supra note 1, at 219 n.24, he has clearly
fallen into the trap of comparing an actual event, the Field Ox Case, to a hypothetical one pulled
from the world of idealized abstractions. This is a classic mistake of sociolegal scholarship that
Zhu is appropriately scornful of when committed by others. His treatment of property rights is
particularly problematic given that China has prospered economically with vaguely defined
property rights. See generally PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (Jean C. Oi
& Andrew G. Walder eds., 1999).
43. ZHU, supra note l, at 225.
44. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
217-20 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 1968) (1914).
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rural life is simpler than urban life, only that law takes urban commerce as
the norm and thus assumes the processes and institutions that create the
common legal understandings necessary to a rule-of-law legal system.
45
Despite this gap, the relationship between village life and metropolitan
law is fluid and dialectical, not static and dichotomous. Every encounter
changes both and contributes to the modernization of rural China. Zhu's
analysis of the impact of the Field Ox Case illustrates the point. He does not
claim that farmers will now be patterning deals with close attention to the
court's interpretation of A and B's arrangement. Rather, the use of the court
in and of itself puts everyone in the village on notice that there is another
institutional actor in town that residents can call on in a dispute. Even if
they find the court's result arbitrary and want to avoid its involvement, they
will be aware of its presence and will take action to protect themselves.
46
This new consciousness of law points inexorably toward modernity.
Rural Chinese will no longer be able to rely on the mutual deference and
personal relationships that have historically protected their interests. Words
and actions that always had one meaning can now mean something
different, and villagers will have to take account of legal rituals and
institutions like documents, signatures, notaries, and registries, which can
become evidence in a trial. As Zhu puts it, they will begin to put more
weight on the future and less on the past, because what must now be proven
is not moral character but compliance with a set of abstract concepts.47 The
shift is profoundly important:
It means the abandonment of social control through traditional
values and its replacement by an amoral system of social control. In
law, the world does not emerge from, and evolve in touch with, life
itself but is instead determined ahead of time via legally recognized
concepts. In this world, people's daily life retreats from center stage
to become merely the background that illuminates legal concepts,
topics, and key words. Life becomes more and more like a play
where the law is the script and the people play legally defined roles.
The play no longer imitates life, but the reverse. The world no
longer acquires its meaning from events and actions but from
abstract symbols, concepts, and propositions without which events
and actions have no meaning.48
Many people will gain power and freedom as they develop the skill of
using law to advance and secure their interests. The adulterous neighbor N
in the Irate Husband Case attempted to do so. Farmer A did so after farmer
45. ZHU, supra note 1, at 219.
46. Id. at 232-37.
47. Id. at 236.
48. Id.
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B had sold the ox, and both farmers are more likely to use the law the next
time they enter into a financial relationship. But as rural Chinese begin to
use law strategically, they will also lose the freedom to act in any other
way. The customary forms of social relations will no longer be available,
not because village Chinese will have been suddenly liberated from the
social ties and values of the rural countryside but because individuals will
begin to use formal law to vindicate customary values.
The husband's demand that his neighbor pay damages even though the
neighbor had committed no legal wrong is an eloquent example of the
instrumental use of law for traditional purposes, but Zhu cautions against
assuming that this case represents the triumph of traditional values over
modem law. Just as legal norms will not fully displace informal ones,
custom will not overwhelm law. No matter how much judges may
sympathize with local values, they remain agents of the state. If ignoring
the positive law to satisfy local grievances harms the state, judges will
answer for it professionally. The result of the dialectic between rural society
and urban law will not be a triumph of one set of norms over the other-
culture, after all, has always molded the state while in turn being created by
it-but the absorption of the self-reliant rural society into the standardized
universe of municipal law. This will take time, people will resist, and the
process may occur more quickly in commercial matters than in others, but
unless he is ready to be mocked by law every time he encounters it, a rural
Chinese person has no choice but to adjust. As with most of the issues that
his research raises, Zhu professes to hold no normative view on this one-
what will be will be, and nothing is served by agonizing over what is lost-
but he does note that, while some will see modernization through the rosy
glasses of the rule of law, others (in the manner of Foucault and Weber)
will see rose as the color of blood.49
3. Judicial Craft at the Basic Level
As both agents of the modernizing state and servants of the local
population, basic court judges find themselves in deeply contradictory roles.
In countries like the United States, where the gap between cultural and legal
norms is smaller, where judges' tenure is generally more secure, and where
judges can call on greater material and institutional support, these roles are
complementary. In rural China, they often are not. If Chinese judges do not
satisfy their judicial superiors by correctly processing a large number of
cases, their careers suffer. If they are not attentive to the concerns of their
colleagues in other local bureaucracies, they face resource constraints and
constant interference. If local residents are unhappy, they can express their
49. Id. at 237.
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dissatisfaction in a number of ways, ranging from appealing the judgment
to fomenting social unrest. The former goes on the judge's record and may
mean the loss of a bonus or the job itself; the latter gets the court in trouble
with the local government and police.5°
Zhu identifies several strategies and techniques developed by basic
court judges to maximize success and minimize vulnerability. One strategy
is to address what matters to the parties rather than its legal manifestation.
With ongoing disputes that involve neighbors and relatives, a narrow legal
result can leave untouched the underlying problem, with a nontrivial chance
of tragic results like murder, suicide, or family violence. The first priority,
therefore, is to address the core of the dispute, an approach that Zhu
illustrates with the story of a woman who asked a court to dissolve her
relationship with her son, who was beating and robbing her.51 Because there
is no such thing as the legal dissolution of the parent-child relationship, the
judge could have dismissed the case and referred the woman to the police.
Instead, he discovered that her husband had long ago disappeared and
devised a novel remedy-that she get a divorce and remarry, thus bringing
another male into the household. The next step was to escort her to the local
legal services center where the judge personally asked the legal worker to
draw up the documents requesting a divorce.52
A second common technique is to minimize formal fact-finding and
procedure. The parties are interested in the result, not the legal process that
leads to it, and anything beyond the bare minimum of process unnecessarily
exposes the judge to appellate review. Thus in the Field Ox Case, once the
court got a basic grasp on the parties' original deal, it took no further steps
to gather evidence or investigate and went directly to cajoling a settlement.
Similarly, in a case brought by parents for support from their children, the
court did not bother to bring all the children formally into the action, but
instead simply suggested a resolution. Although bureaucratic efficiency is
also a factor, judges are primarily interested in protecting themselves on
appeal. The simpler the facts and the shorter the record, the easier it is to
wrap pragmatic decisions in the cloak of doctrine. Zhu's point is not that
basic court judges are inattentive to the facts or that the process is quick or
simple. Reaching a resolution that satisfies all parties requires a command
of the factual and social context that likely goes well beyond what is legally
relevant, but as long as the facts are not officially recognized, they remain
invisible to appellate courts. 3
A third frequent practice is the use of every possible resource of the
50. Id. at 272-95.
51. Id. at 178-80.
52. Id. at 178.
53. Id. at 276-77.
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system to protect judges' interests. Thus when Beijing attempted to reduce
judicial mistakes with the "Eradicate Wrong Decisions" campaign, judges
tried to avoid individual responsibility by referring more cases to the
adjudication committee. They do the same whenever the local government,
the Party, or "the masses" bring pressure in order to avoid responsibility in
what is often a no-win situation. Even when a case is not so troubling that it
merits referral to the committee, a judge is likely to ask the advice of senior
judges or the court president. Judges are also very conscious that any decree
or result must be enforceable and frequently engage local authorities in
fashioning the remedy, 54 as we saw with the Shaanxi debt collection case
and the court president's efforts in the tractor accident case.
Zhu also notes that judges commonly avoid social responsibility for
unpopular decisions by exaggerating the severity of the law. Doing so
makes any decision less harsh than the inflated maximum seem like the
result of the judge's personal compassion for the parties and is particularly
common in debt and divorce cases. We saw it in the court's litany of
potential penalties in the Shaanxi case, and it was even more flagrant in the
treatment of the adulterous neighbor in the Irate Husband Case. Despite
being jailed and forced to pay compensation without any legal basis
whatsoever, at the end of the day the neighbor was effusively grateful that
the judge had let him off so lightly.
Zhu emphasizes that these judicial techniques are not manifestations of
Chinese culture or tradition. 6 Quite the contrary: They result from the
arrival of the formal legal system in the villages and represent a transitional
stage between historical practices and the marketization of rural society.
The judge's primary goal may be party satisfaction, but if a judicial decree
is necessary, it must be in coherent legal form and consistent with
fundamental principles and procedures. The judge must mold the facts of
the parties' behavior and intentions into a narrative that complies with the
language and logic of the law, emphasizing what is legally significant and
downplaying what is not. In doing so, the judge may distort the law and
mislead the residents as to its content, but the end result will be the triumph
of (legal) language over historical practice.57
These techniques may be steps toward modernity and the rule of law,
but the road ahead is hardly straightforward, and arrival at some Western-
style legal system seems far from certain. The same strategies and
techniques that allow rural judges to serve their diverse masters
simultaneously-betraying legal norms to preserve social stability or to
54. Id. at 282-83.
55, Id. at 278.
56. Id. at 270-71.
57. Id. at 282-83.
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defuse village disputes without being detected by appellate courts-are also
a form of "lawlessness." They are used, Zhu stresses, not only for noble
purposes but also to cover up corruption, to protect local bureaucratic
interests, and to camouflage other forms of self-serving judicial behavior.
Although Zhu clearly admires local judges, he is not blind to the
contradiction inherent in judicial practices that allow the modernization
process to continue while simultaneously moving the judiciary further away
from the professionalization that even Zhu recognizes is the ultimate goal.
II. INTERPRETING SENDING LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE
A full evaluation of Sending Law to the Countryside must await further
research on the techniques, attitudes, and institutional context of Chinese
rural courts.58 For the moment, let us proceed on the assumption that the
data and analysis are generally accurate and representative of at least large
parts of rural China. If so, Zhu's description of the Chinese judicial system
at the village level makes a significant contribution to the understanding of
contemporary Chinese law and, more broadly, of the variety of potential
judicial roles in contemporary societies, particularly in the developing
world. In this Part, I assess Zhu's theoretical approach and scholarly
contribution and what I consider the book's greatest flaw, its failure to deal
with the role of political power in China's basic courts.
A. Zhu's Theoretical Assumptions and the Absence of Politics
Very little of Sending Law to the Countryside is typical of
58. I was not able to find any convincing analysis of the research team's data or
methodological choices. A couple of reviewers doubted the representativeness of either Zhu's
choice of cases or the regions of China that his team visited or both, but they gave no evidence to
substantiate their skepticism. See Xiao Han, Jiedu "Song fa xiaxiang" [Reading and
Understanding Sending Law to the Countryside], SOC. SC. CHINA, Vol. 3, 2002, at 92; Ke Lan,
Song shenmeyang defa xiaxiang?-Du "Song fa xiaxiang" defi dian yiwen [What Kind of Law Is
Sent to the Countryside?-Some Questions After Reading Sending Law to the Countryside],
http://www.gongfa.com/dusongfaxiaxiangkelan.htm (last edited June 18, 2001). The general
response has been to praise the research team's methodology if not to agree with Zhu's
conclusions and interpretations. See, e.g., Liu Xing, Zoujin xianshi defalu shenghuo-Ping "Song
fa xiaxiang" [Walk into the Real Legal Life-Commenting on Sending Law to the Countryside],
SOC. SCI. CHINA, Vol. 3, 2002, at 114; Zhang Zhimei, Zai lu shang- "Song fa xiaxiang "yi ge
duben [On the Way-One Reading of Sending Law to the Countryside], SOC. SCI. CHINA, Vol. 3,
2002, at 105. One exception is Liu Sida, whose empirical work on Qinghe Village presents a
somewhat different picture of the nature of judicial personnel-he found no former military
personnel joining the local judiciary after the 1990s-but is otherwise generally consistent with
Zhu's account, especially when it comes to the triumph of pragmatism over formal structure. Liu
emphasizes even more than Zhu the myriad influences on the courts that operate outside of the
relatively clear institutional framework of the adjudication committee. Sida Liu, Transplanting and
Decoupling Legal Institutions: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court 46 tbl. 1 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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contemporary Chinese legal scholarship, at least if Zhu is to be believed.
Empirical work of any kind is rare, and attention to rural areas virtually
nonexistent. Most research has been preoccupied with the construction of
an efficient market economy, the needs of commerce and industry, and the
regulation of markets. Even in these areas there is little critical analysis or
penetration behind the doctrinal faqade of Western (or Taiwanese) codes
and statutes. Zhu does not dispute the need for such research, but he argues
that Chinese academics need to know the social reality of Chinese law as
well as the theory of the WTO and international best practices in the
taxation of dividends, if for no other reason than academic self-respect.
Chinese scholars ignore the one area where they have an advantage and
spend their time "warming the leftovers of Western scholarship." 59 Zhu's
intent in writing Sending Law to the Countryside was not, therefore, merely
to describe the reality of rural courts or prescribe policy for them but to
make a mark on global legal scholarship by elucidating the theoretical
significance of the most concrete events and practices that he encountered.
To do so, he uses an eclectic collection of theoretical and
methodological tools. 60 He claims Marxist historical materialism as his
basic framework, and his fundamental assumption is that judicial
phenomena are better explained as functional responses to social demands
than as manifestations of culture, values, or tradition.6' His Marxism,
however, is very much of the "neo" variety, and he is particularly attracted
to American law and economics, which, he wryly notes, shares the basic
materialist assumptions of Marxism. 62 With the exception of an occasional
quote from Mao, names of Western social theorists like Bourdieu, Foucault,
Geertz, and Hayek and American legal luminaries like Dworkin, Holmes,
Posner, and Scalia dominate the references. In this ideological universe, he
cannot claim that legal scholarship can directly produce social change, but
rather that it can generate a consensus on the relationship of law and social
59. ZHU, supra note 1, at 15, 14-16. This debate began with ZHU SULI, FAZHI JI
BENTUZIYUAN [THE RULE OF LAW AND NATIVE RESOURCES] (1996), which urged China to look
primarily to its own institutions and experience in reforming its legal system rather than relying on
Western models. Other scholars have criticized Zhu for heaping praise on native Chinese
institutions while uncritically dismissing Western ones. See, e.g., Xu Aiguo, Weifazhi er
douzheng-Xi Suli de Fazhi ji bentuziyuan [The Struggle for the Rule of Law: An Analysis of
Suli's The Rule of Law and Native Resources], in I PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW ANTHOLOGY 274
(2002) (referring to Zhu as a disillusioned reformer transformed into a "nativist authoritarian,"
whose "blind adoration of Chinese customs" and equally uncritical negation of Western models
will aggravate the most recalcitrant problems plaguing the Chinese legal system). He Weifang has
been more williig to engage Zhu on his own terms. See, e.g., He Weifang, Zhongguo sifa
guanlizhidu de liangge wenti [Two Problems in China's System of Judicial Administration], SOC.
SCI. CHINA, Vol. 6, 1997, at 117, available at http://www.boxun.com/sixiang/000218/1O.htm.
60. ZHU, supra note 1, at 59-60.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 187.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005] 1699
The Yale Law Journal
life that is a necessary foundation of the rule of law.6 3 To provide a sense of
Zhu's own conception of this relationship, this Section looks first at his
theoretical pedigree and then at one aspect of social theory that is curiously
missing: the role of political power.
1. A Realist and Modernist
Zhu is a no-nonsense realist about judging. His basic court judges often
do not know the applicable rules, much less the Dworkinian "right answer,"
which he treats so contemptuously. Nor need they. Their role is to resolve
disputes, and while one can imagine a formalist approach to this task, Zhu
engages in no such musing and cuts straight to the core of his subjects'
approach: Deal with the underlying conflict, not its legal manifestations;
don't make it worse; try to satisfy all parties, even if it requires distorting
their understanding of the law; and be sure that you vet the proposed
resolution with the necessary bureaucratic players. Doctrine plays a limited
role. The court must dress up the result in appropriate doctrinal clothes, but
finding suitable formulations is not difficult and has little impact on the
actual result. For this reason, the additional legal sophistication of
university law graduates is of dubious value and would be outright harmful
if they were to allow the formalism of legal education to tempt them away
from the proven techniques of pragmatic dispute resolution.
Zhu's realism reflects well his subjects' day-to-day professional life,
but it coexists uncomfortably with his own uncritical acceptance of a linear
version of modernization theory. This tension emerges clearly from his
debates with He Weifang and other colleagues. Zhu accepts the ultimate
desirability of a legal system built along Western lines, but he claims that
the Chinese countryside is not yet ready for a formalist judiciary. As
marketization proceeds and brings farmers' values into line with those of
urban Chinese, the disjuncture between statutory law and community norms
will disappear. Indeed, that is for him the primary role of basic courts: to
use dispute resolution to standardize rural society as capitalism has
standardized the cities. The result will be the first effective national
government since the Opium War and a judiciary that is as capable of norm
diffusion as the contemporary basic courts are of resolving disputes.
Unfortunately, this scenario is neither supported by Zhu's data nor
consistent with his summary dismissal of rule-of-law models as guides for
basic courts. Throughout his description of what courts do, he stresses the
absence of unifying forces. He argues that once rural Chinese have had
contact with the law, they will become aware of the courts' institutional
presence and will act with the possibility of legal action in mind, but his
63. Id. at 14.
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data give no reason to believe that the legal action that may ensue will be
any less subject to the vagaries of judicial capacity and local government
(and Party) demands than at present. Without a unified legal system strong
enough to withstand outside interference and judges both skilled and secure
enough to discover and apply the rules neutrally, basic courts will continue
to serve as administrative agents of the local government and population
rather than as instruments of national unification.
Even if the resource and training issues were resolved, Zhu gives no
reason other than an incongruous faith in modernization theory to believe
that the "rule of law as a law of rules" model advocated by Justice Scalia
64
will reign in Chinese courts any time soon. Zhu's theoretical framework,
while charmingly eclectic, lacks the clear perspective that could articulate
the role law will play in the standardization of society that he claims will
occur. Perhaps he believes that transformations of this type are the
exclusive province of economic forces and that it is fanciful to attribute any
role to the law itself, but a more likely explanation is a simple inability to
imagine that China could create a modem legal system that would
significantly deviate from Western models.
Like Kawashima Takeyoshi, the famous postwar Japanese legal
sociologist, Zhu may be so embedded in modernization theory that he
cannot see the variety of destinations that modernization can lead to.65 Of
course, Kawashima was concerned not with whether to import Western
models-those decisions had already been made-but with why Japanese
courts functioned so differently from their Western antecedents. Instead of
Zhu's focus on how judges handle an increasing number of disputes, he
tried to explain why judges handled so few. Nonetheless, Kawashima's
ideological assumptions about law in developing societies have much in
common with those of contemporary Chinese (and non-Chinese) scholars
and may help us not only to understand Zhu better but also to gauge how
much sociolegal scholarship has changed in the last fifty years.
Like Zhu, Kawashima saw a gap between legal norms and social
practice and assumed that it was the product of the foreign origin of the
norms and the premodern nature of native society. He acknowledged that
Japanese avoided courts for many of the same reasons that people do
everywhere-cost, time, and the small likelihood of a satisfactory result-
but he is better known for the cultural gloss he put on Japan's legal
consciousness: that litigation was antithetical to traditional Japanese values.
The failure of Japanese society to live up to its Western law, therefore, was
not solely an empirical fact; it was also a normative disappointment. As
64. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
65. Kawashima's best-known work is KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSHI, NIHONJIN NO HOUISHIKI
[THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] (1967).
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long as Japanese society did not use law as Kawashima imagined the West
did, Japan's legal institutions could be neither modem nor effective.
Similarly, like both contemporary Chinese scholars and most law-and-
development reformers, Kawashima assumed both that it was inevitable
that Japanese society would evolve to fit its formal legal system and that
this evolution was a good thing.
There are important differences between the two scholars' work.
Kawashima focused on culture and values, what they were as well as how
they interfered with legal modernization. Zhu cares about culture only as a
hurdle in the basic court judges' modernizing path, not as an object worthy
of study in itself. The contrasting attitudes should not, however, obscure
what is similar. Despite fifty years of legal development in Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea, Zhu appears to hold without reservation the assumption
that China's legal system will evolve toward models based on Western
experience. When Kawashima was writing, there were few theoretical
alternatives to the Western model. Certainly, there were no Asian examples.
Japan's prewar legal system had been thoroughly discredited by militarism,
Chinese attempts at legal modernization had failed, and what we now call
the developing world was largely under colonial rule. The exotica of
cultural anthropology was not a plausible option, which effectively left
Western modernity as represented by the United States. While Japan's own
long history of state-sponsored alternatives to litigation might have
provided a model under other circumstances, it would have been politically
impossible for a postwar Japanese academic, especially a leading liberal
theorist like Kawashima, to invoke Japan's recent past.
Zhu Suli, on the other hand, does not inhabit a similarly limited
intellectual environment. As his frequent citations to Western social
scientists demonstrate, he is aware of alternatives to the classic models, and
Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are too frequently mentioned as sources of
legal imports for Zhu not to be aware of them as potential examples for
reform efforts. Of course it is possible that he is simply taking the path of
least resistance. The formalist rule-of-law model with its calls for clear
property rights and strict contract enforcement sets the ideological tone for
law reform efforts whether undertaken by international financial
institutions, the American government, or Chinese academics, and it may be
too much to expect Zhu to deviate. This explanation, however, rings
hollow. Zhu relishes too much the role of intellectual maverick to pass up a
chance to mock the comfortable acceptance of Western orthodoxy.
An alternative explanation is more interesting: He may have considered
all these factors and concluded that, exceptions and limitations like Japan
notwithstanding, convergence theory is correct. He may see Japan's current
restructuring of legal education, its decision to dramatically increase the
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number of lawyers, and its efforts to expand the role of the judiciary as
vindication of the inevitability of convergence. He may, in other words,
have examined the alternatives to linear modernization theory, from
American legal realism to Japanese exceptionalism, and found them to be
evanescent deviations from the path that all successful societies are
ordained to take. From our vantage point, it is impossible to do more than
speculate about which of these explanations, if any, is operating.
2. The Absence of Politics and Political Power
However iconoclastic Sending Law to the Countryside may be in the
context of Chinese legal scholarship, it is reticent to the point of timidity
when it comes to politics. Aside from the small-p politics of bureaucratic
infighting, power is virtually absent. Although the creation of a rule-of-law
country is an official goal of the state and the Communist Party, Zhu gives
no hint of how the courts would deal with politically and ideologically
charged cases under such a regime. One can readily imagine that the
adjudication committee would be nothing more than an ideological
enforcer, routinely disciplining judges who put legal craft above Party
loyalty, but it is not inconceivable that the judiciary could develop a limited
autonomy that would enable judges to function as conscientious enforcers
of legal norms and neutral arbiters of local conflict within the constraints of
the Party's leadership. Unfortunately Zhu gives no indication of which
alternative (or some third) is more likely or of his own views on the matter,
and that silence renders it impossible to understand his advocacy of basic
court judges either as agents of the modem state or as preservers of local
social stability.
To put this point in a concrete context, we need only return to the
dispute resolution that Zhu stresses is the courts' primary role. Without
local knowledge and legitimacy, judges will not be able to satisfy litigants,
avoid exacerbating underlying conflict, or prevent social unrest. All this
makes sense, but Zhu does not tell us where the Party comes in. Is the Party
affiliation of the population part of a judge's necessary local knowledge?
Does the need to enforce Party mandates and ideological rectitude take
precedence over gaining legitimacy? Or wiil basic court judges use their
myriad obfuscating techniques to favor local interests and values over Party
discipline?
Even if we assume that all courts will toe the Party line, as Zhu seems
to imply, the question remains of who within a given court determines the
relevant Party line. It is also unclear whether the Party's power will be
exercised only to protect its ideological interests or institutional and
personal ones as well. Does Zhu expect the adjudication committee to resist
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interference or corruption when it comes via the Party as strongly as when it
comes from the local government, the police, or the populace? Similarly,
can the court assume that the Party will be neutral between litigants so long
as the Party as an institution is not involved? Or are we to assume that
Party-supported litigants will always prevail and that Zhu's discussion
relates only to the residuum of cases unrelated to the Party? Zhu argues that
former officers make satisfactory judges because they have a unique blend
of local knowledge and openness that distinguishes them from both
university graduates and transferred local bureaucrats. Yet he discusses
these sources of judicial personnel as if they were politically and
ideologically identical and as if we could evaluate their potential
effectiveness without knowing how they relate to the Party.
In Zhu's defense, one might argue that Party interference is so unlikely
that it is not worth addressing. The stakes are low in basic courts, and there
is little reason to believe that the Party is interested in how the proceeds in
the Field Ox Case are divided, how fully the farmer who lost his leg is
compensated, or whether an adulterous neighbor has to compensate his
lover's husband. This argument, however, ignores instances like the
Shaanxi debt collection case or the conviction of policeman Wang, where
Party interests are obvious, and it seems to run counter to the premise of
Sending Law to the Countryside that the judiciary's role is to stabilize rural
society and extend the power of the state into the far reaches of China. If
Zhu is correct in interpreting the courts' role in this way, it would seem that
the Party would be very concerned with how the judiciary carried out its
mission, especially at its lowest levels, including which farmers it favored,
whether to indict the policeman Wangs of the world, and even whether
abused mothers could find relief and protection from the courts.
A second objection to addressing the Party explicitly might be that it is
virtually impossible to discuss it as a distinct entity. The Party is
inextricably intertwined with governmental and commercial interests at
every level of society down to the most remote village. Virtually all
significant officials, including judges, are at least acceptable to the Party
and are usually members. So if a local bureaucrat demands protection for a
local business, does his Party membership turn his interference into an act
by the Chinese Communist Party, or is it "merely" governmental
interference? If the bureaucrat is bringing the pressure because the manager
of the business is his brother-in-law, is it Party interference, simple
corruption, or something more complex? The answer cannot be that it is
Party interference only when consistent with the current ideological or
policy line. As with any dynamic political entity, ideological rivalries and
policy differences exist within the Party at all levels, making it less than
crystal clear what course to take even if the judge is devoted to the Party
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line. When there is division, how is the judge or court president to
determine which line to follow in a particular case? Does she look to the
precepts of the Central Political-Legal Committee or to Party authorities
closer to home? These are empirical questions that would have made any
discussion of the Party complex, but Zhu's silence on the issue makes it
very difficult to understand how rural courts can play the role that he
assigns them.
Zhu's failure to address political power has another consequence, one
that his attention to diffused power should have enabled him to avoid. He
emphasizes that the cooperation of village cadres is often a key to the
courts' success and recognizes that these cadres are not solely instruments
of the state but also draw power from the village. Their cooperation with
the court is not guaranteed and does not arise solely from their position in a
governmental hierarchy. Nowhere, however, does Zhu entertain the
possibility that basic courts themselves may play a similarly Janus-faced
role between the center and periphery, at times an instrument of state power
but at other times a means for residents to resist some forms of that power.
His treatment of the courts' external political role is strangely
unidirectional and particularly disappointing given his nuanced discussion
of bureaucratic politics within the judiciary and between the judiciary and
other governmental entities. When it comes to the courts themselves,
however, state and society are distinct-rural Chinese are on one side of the
line and the courts on the other. He celebrates villagers' power to resist the
courts' integrative function-that claim is the basis of much of the book-
but nowhere discusses the possibility that local residents will transgress the
state-society line and use the courts proactively to pursue their interests
against the state and Party. He recognizes that rural Chinese realize that the
judiciary's institutional power may be used against them, either by the state
or by their fellow residents, but not that they may take the next step and
realize that the courts may in some circumstances be available for them to
use against the state as well.
It seems unlikely that he is afraid to be seen as advocating a tactic of
resistance that goes beyond what the Party would find legitimate. One of
the universally anticipated roles of Chinese courts is controlling corruption,
local protectionism, cadre abuse, and so on, all of which potentially involve
resident-initiated conflict with local authority. Zhu himself repeatedly
stresses the role of the adjudication committee in resisting government
pressure, and one of the reasons that he advocates the use of former military
officers is their supposedly greater insulation from parochial loyalties. It is
clear, in other words, that all observers expect the courts to develop
independent power sufficient to withstand "illegitimate" interference, but if
the courts do so, they will be available not only to the central authorities but
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also, albeit on a contingent basis, to anyone who brings his grievance to
them.
This is true not because of some romantic view of judicial
statesmenship but because courts are not only agents of the state but also
sites for social, economic, and political conflict. A group of farmers may
complain about pollution from a local business or a village about the
unauthorized or undercompensated transfer of agricultural land to other
uses. The conflict may initially and primarily be among citizens and its
political nature of the small-p variety, but eventually some of these disputes
will acquire broader meaning. This transformation is more likely in a
democracy with a free press-witness the role of pollution litigation in
changing political priorities in 1970s Japan 66-but even regimes like
China's depend on a sense of legitimacy that cannot be assumed, and the
Chinese media amply reflect the varying strains within the regime today.67
In some circumstances, the courts become the locus of political conflict
whatever the desires of the judges to the contrary. We saw this in the trial of
policeman Wang. There the court could not avoid becoming the site of
political conflict; its eventual judgment was an explicitly political act
designed to pacify the local populace at the cost of an innocent police
officer. Ironically, if the government is successful in building up the courts
as an instrument of social control, such instances will increase, and yet Zhu
gives us no way to gauge how the courts will handle them, whether they
will play an active role in developing and articulating popular interests and
grievances, or how the Party will try to control and exploit this role.
Like his inattention to the role of the Communist Party, Zhu's failure to
consider the possibility that basic courts will become sites of popular
resistance creates gaps in his discussion of the potential roles and
capabilities of the basic courts, as brief speculation on his advocacy of
former military officers as basic court judges illustrates. If Zhu is correct in
his claim that the military stresses meritocratic advancement and openness
to new ideas more than do local bureaucracies, one could imagine that
staffing courts with retired officers may make courts more likely to defend
popular interests. This may be particularly true given the reputation of local
officials for overburdening farmers across a range of issues from taxation to
land conversion. On the other hand, one could also imagine officers being
more repressive. Perhaps they are accustomed to harsh discipline and more
willing to condone the use of force, or their service in the military may
make it difficult for them to empathize with local farmers. Or perhaps it is
much simpler than all this, and former officers' views soon become the
66. See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 28-77 (1987).
67. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal
System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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same as local officials' once they realize that their housing, salary, and
general well-being are now dependent on the largesse of the local
bureaucracy.
Where an observer comes down on these politically charged issues
affects her appraisal of whether basic courts can play the social control role
that everyone from Communist Party leaders to American law professors
are eager to assign to them. Zhu puts great weight on popular legitimacy,
but he limits his discussion to the courts' dispute resolution role, ignoring
both the actual and potential impact of their stance on broader social and
political issues.68 While there may be excellent reasons for discreet silence
on the topic of courts and political power for many Chinese scholars, the
dean of Beijing University Law School would seem to be in a unique
position to address such issues, even if only indirectly. It is important to
reiterate that developing the Chinese legal system is not simply the dream
of the U.S. State Department and the Ford Foundation; it is also the explicit
policy of the PRC and is being actively pursued under the rubric of "the
rule of law." While it may be unfair to ask any scholar, dean or not, to take
normative positions in his scholarship, Zhu does so repeatedly in Sending
Law to the Countryside, from his criticisms of Chinese legal education to
his teasing of his colleagues for an infatuation with Western theories. Given
that he clearly wants to be engaged in these issues, his silence on one this
fundamental is puzzling.
B. Chinese Basic Court Judges and Law and Development
It is perhaps inevitable that law-and-development reformers look to the
West for models. The legal systems of developed countries are by definition
successful, although it is far from clear in which direction the causal
connection runs. Conversely, the number of poor societies with successful
legal systems is small. India may be an example, but the list is short.
Furthermore, the West is where the money is. India is not funding the
computerization of Ugandan courts, or dispatching its professors to lecture
the Bolivians on the importance of clear property rights, or providing
68. Lurking in the background of Zhu's discussion of legitimacy, local knowledge, and
dispute resolution is the concept ofjustice. As with guanxi, he studiously avoids the term, perhaps
for the same reason: It is so difficult to define and so variously used that it has no social scientific
bite. It is also possible that he considers conceptions of justice to be as fragmented in rural China
as more mundane questions like the meaning of dahuo, the obligations of adulterers, or the
propriety of a slap on the wrist of policeman Wang. Or he may believe that his use of legitimacy
can do the analytically useful work of justice without forcing him to enter its emotive morass. I
too have avoided the concept, partly for its lack of definition and partly because addressing the
role of justice in China is substantially beyond my capabilities. My primary reason, however, is
that I assume that Zhu includes justice in his use of legitimacy. If not, much of what he says about
the courts' role in extending the Chinese state into the hinterlands makes little sense.
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scholarships for Filipinos to attend the National Law School, and it would
likely not matter if it were. Even if Third World reformers doubted the
applicability of Western models to their problems, they at least have to
pretend to imitate Western practice because their countries will be punished
if they do not. An increasing number of national governments and
international financial institutions have begun to condition loans, aid, and
trade access on the perceived quality of poor countries' legal systems,69 and
it will be very difficult for even the most broad-minded officials to measure
quality by any metric other than the familiar institutions of America or
Europe. As a consequence, the reformer's attention naturally tends toward
the institutions of the developed world.
There are alternative sources of models, however. One is the legal and
economic history of now-rich countries. But the problem with looking to
legal history is that very little has been written with law-and-development
issues in mind. There are exceptions, 7° but they are few, and there is no
reason to expect either contemporary legal historians to find law and
development compelling or law-and-development reformers to spend time
doing serious history.
A second alternative is the indigenous institutions of contemporary
developing countries themselves. Here the relevance is clear, but the
problems are substantial, beginning with the paucity of successful legal
systems, especially ones that have functioned well over a long enough time
to be sure of their long-term effectiveness. For example, the aggressive
encouragement of public interest litigation by the Supreme Court of India
has been widely praised, but the performance of lower courts continues to
lag.71 It is also true that empirical scholarship on contemporary
69. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. D, tit. VI,
2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (118 Stat.) 3, 211-26 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7718) (Millennium
Challenge Act of 2003). The Millennium Challenge Corporation selected sixteen nations as
eligible to propose specific projects to be financed by the Millennium Challenge Fund.
Christopher Marquis, Africans May Claim Much of $3.5 Billion in U.S. Reform Rewards, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A3.
70. I have briefly speculated elsewhere about the relevance of the American legal system's
treatment of technological change in the nineteenth century to that of today's developing
countries. For legal histories that have direct, if inadvertent, relevance to current issues in law and
development, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY (1996); and FRANK UPHAM,
MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace,
Democracy & Rule of Law Project, Rule of Law Series, No. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf. For a direct comparison of contemporary
China and nineteenth-century America in this context, see Michael W. Dowdle, Visibilizing the
Invisible Hand: Exploring for New Forms of Public Accountability, in EXPLORING PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: LAW, DESIGN, AND EXPERIENCE (Michael W. Dowdle ed., forthcoming 2005)
(on file with author).
71. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal
Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE
RULE OF LAW 96 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
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modernization efforts is not plentiful. Western interest in law in poor
countries has tended to be anthropological rather than aimed at the core
issues of the law-and-development movement. That perspective is rapidly
changing, but the norm remains the in-house evaluation of existing
programs, which cannot substitute for independent scholarship. 72 Of course,
if we take Zhu's emphasis on local knowledge seriously, it may not matter
because it may be just as difficult to imitate developing-country models
successfully as it is to imitate Western ones.
These obstacles notwithstanding, legal imitation will continue for the
simple reason that there is no alternative. It may be that basic court judges
in rural China have little in common with the visions dancing in senators'
heads when they condition aid on progress toward the rule of law, but that
does not mean that Chinese courts' situation will not be relevant to other
developing countries (or vice versa), to practitioners assisting in legal
reform, or to scholars trying to determine what kind of judicial systems can
contribute to growth. This Section, therefore, explores ways in which the
experience of Chinese basic court judges may give us insight into the major
questions facing law-and-development theory and practice.73
1. Chinese Basic Court Judges and the Formalist Rule-of-Law Model
Zhu's portrait of basic court judges stands in stark contrast to the
rhetoric of most First World proponents of reform. An example from the
1980s demonstrates. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of the World
Bank's development loans, the Bank's general counsel, Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, identified the rule of law as crucial for economic growth and
defined the rule of law as abstract rules embedded in institutions that
strictly apply them to factual situations:
Reform policies cannot be effective in the absence of a system
which translates them into workable rules and makes sure they are
complied with. Such a system assumes that: a) there is a set of rules
which are known in advance, b) such rules are actually in force, c)
72. One exception is BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE, supra note 71. The problem with
programmatic evaluations is exemplified by MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED
WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary McClymont & Stephen
Golub eds., 2000), the Ford Foundation's evaluation of its many rule-of-law and public interest
law programs. While containing a wealth of data on the Ford Foundation's efforts, it is an
unremittingly optimistic story with virtually no mention of failures or incompetence.
73. In doing so, I am taking the institutions and governments that urge developing countries
to create the rule of law at face value. If, on the other hand, rule-of-law advocates are really
concerned only with the legal protection of international creditors or investors, that can probably
be achieved best by creating ad hoc institutions like China's International Economic Trade
Arbitration Commission, designed for that specific purpose, rather than trying to build entire legal
systems.
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mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules and
to allow for departure from them as needed according to established
procedures, d) conflicts in the application of the rules can be
resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial or
arbitral body and e) there are known procedures for amending the
rules when they no longer serve their purpose.74
The role of law in this model is clear: Judges and courts shape primary
behavior by the independent and strict enforcement of centrally created and
controlled rules.
Two aspects of this model deserve elaboration in the Chinese context.
First, rule formalism requires a normative and epistemological separation of
courts from society. It is not sufficient that judges be honest and
institutionally autonomous enough to withstand external pressure.
Formalism further demands that judges be insulated from society itself, that
they look only to legal rules in making decisions, that they not be managers
of social conflict but appliers of rules. Second, but less frequently
recognized, this form of judicial independence requires the domination of
central politics over local society. In adjudication, judges are not to interpret
rules in light of the values of the local population, the parties'
understanding of the rules' language or meaning, or the effect of the rules'
application on local expectations or interests. On the contrary, the ideal is
for judges to live in the same intellectual and normative universe as
lawmakers and to resist any temptation or pressure to tailor the content of
the rules to fit local social reality.
This model expects much of judges, but it puts distinct demands on
legislators and society as well. Legislators must create rules that are
intelligible to ordinary people and that cover all foreseeable circumstances.
Society, in turn, must learn the rules. Intelligible rules that anticipate all
possible events are not the sole responsibility of their drafters, but rather
emerge only after a process of interpretation and application by a broad
range of officials from the police to the highest court. The model, therefore,
is procedural as well as substantive, and the process depends on well-
functioning bureaucracies linked across governmental institutions and from
the center to the periphery. In the end, the process creates universal norms
that can be applied uniformly whether the court is sitting in Shaanxi or
74. 1 IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, The World Bank and "Governance" Issues in Its Borrowing
Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 53, 85 (Franziska
Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991). It is important to note that Shihata's memorandum
oversimplified the nature of law and legal systems in order to persuade the World Bank to pay
attention to the quality of the legal systems of recipient countries. By using the passage above, I
am not implying that contemporary legal reformers at the World Bank and elsewhere are innocent
of the complicated nature of legal reform. Nonetheless, this style of rhetoric continues to dominate
the public debate and is likely to be taken at face value by many if not most observers without
firsthand experience in legal reform.
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Shanghai, with local variations possible only when anticipated by the norms
and articulated by Shihata's "mechanisms" and "established procedures" of
the model, not by ad hoc adjustments of individual judges or courts.
Whether or not this type of legal system and society is one's ideal
vision for China, the current situation is very different. Instead of acting as
independent appliers of abstract norms to standardized facts, basic court
judges act as specialized components of local bureaucracies dedicated to
defusing social conflict by the effective resolution of local disputes. Instead
of being insulated from society, they bargain with it. In certain
circumstances they represent local society in opposition to centralized
norms, not solely or primarily in terms of illegitimate "local protectionism,"
but also in terms of vindicating and realizing local expectations of justice
and law.
Zhu's attitude toward this process is ambivalent and ambiguous. He
celebrates the flexibility and sensitivity needed to satisfy local expectations,
and he claims that the courts are extending the institutional power of the
state into the countryside, but he never tells us how ad hoc, fact-specific
adjudication can build a unified, national institution. On the contrary, he
portrays the courts' current role as a temporary, stopgap solution needed
because of the judges' lack of professional skill and rural society's lack of
standardization. Although he praises the judges' imagination and argues
that conditions are not right for the importation of Western models, he stops
far short of describing the current situation as normatively desirable or
giving the reader any sense of the mechanism by which current practices
contribute to the modem (and perhaps formalist) courts that he sees as part
of China's distant future.
Why Zhu heaps praise on judges who he ultimately agrees are
premodem and destined to be replaced by a judiciary like that advocated by
the World Bank may be explained by the theoretical contradictions explored
in the previous Section. Zhu is simultaneously a modernist-not so
different from Kawashima, Shihata, or the Chinese imitators of the West
who he loves to ridicule-and an empirical social scientist concerned with
reality on the ground. Although he sees the shortcomings of the formalist
model, he seems as unable to envision an alternative model as are his
critics, which is unfortunate because the formalist model is hardly
unchallenged either as a prescription for developing countries' courts and
judiciaries or as a description of the role of First World judges. A brief
digression into recent scholarship on American discrimination litigation
illustrates that it is not only basic court judges in Shaanxi who adopt a
proactive and administrative style in resolving disputes.
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2. Chinese Basic Court Judges and One View ofAmerican Judges
American judges now encounter litigation alleging race and sex
discrimination where the bias is embedded in institutional structure and
cultural stereotypes and may be not only unintended but also unconsciously
held. The fact patterns cannot be easily understood or resolved by judges
limited to the strict application of legal rules and constrained by a formal
conception of civil procedure and adjudication. Just as village disputes exist
within a rural society that fits imperfectly with the preconceptions of
modem law, these forms of discrimination are too varied and too
intertwined in social practice to be frilly articulated by statute. And just as
basic court judges go beyond the passive judicial role to resolve conflict in
a way acceptable within their social setting, so do American judges act
aggressively to understand and address these complex and culturally
ambiguous issues.
Very importantly, however, they do so without sacrificing the norm-
creation function of the judiciary that Zhu so quickly abandons when faced
with the gap between legal rules and social reality. Recent scholarship by
Susan Sturm indicates that, in functionally similar circumstances, American
judges have devised ways to go outside the settings of conventional
litigation to gather data and consult stakeholders and yet still use litigation
to create norms that add to a general understanding of the issues:
These processes generate learning and outcomes that are more
generally applicable, even if they have less formally binding effect
than a formal adjudication. These settings include determinations of
the scope of and participants in resolving the legal conflict, as well
as proceedings about settlement and remedy. Outside the formal
law-making and enforcement process, actors participate in norm
elaboration that directly contributes to the content of formal legal
norms, and courts sometimes actively shape the contours of that
informal norm elaboration process.75
American judges are not willing, in other words, to forgo the norm-
diffusion function of adjudication even as they find the classic approaches
incapable of resolving or even understanding these disputes. The details of
how American judges in this context can both reach just settlements in
specific litigation and create norms that contribute to a wider jurisprudence
of equality are not of direct relevance to our inquiry. But Sturm's argument
that the two functions are not mutually exclusive, even when judges are
75. Susan Sturm, Law, Norms, and Complex Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES (Laura B. Nielsen & Robert
L. Nelson eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
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faced with disputes that are deeply embedded in complex social
relationships, may give us hope. Sturm's insights, when applied to China,
suggest that seemingly idiosyncratic and fact-specific arrangements crafted
by Chinese judges can contribute to a more effective and more widely
applicable set of legal norms and judicial practices than would seem likely
from Zhu's emphasis on local knowledge and factual contingency.
Sturm begins with the claim that there exist "problems for which some
state intervention is needed" but for which "coercion through rule
enforcement may not be justified or workable,"76 language that recalls
Zhu's description of the issues facing Chinese basic court judges. In these
cases, Sturm advocates that courts engage in a proactive dispute resolution
process both inside and outside the confines of the court. She sees
American courts facilitating, rather than actively leading, these processes,
but as we have seen, Chinese basic courts are likely to do this work
themselves, undoubtedly because they operate in a society without many of
the private institutions and administrative agencies that figure in Sturm's
model. She also envisions a process that will be "collaborative, deliberative,
and accountable" and linked to the creation of "collective learning and
norm generation, 77 language that brings to mind Zhu's description of the
adjudication committee, with its careful speaking order and on-the-record
voting. Although Zhu prefers to focus solely on dispute resolution, there
may be instances where the basic courts also create "collective
understandings" by consulting local authorities, village cadres, and relevant
stakeholders, even if they are doing so without either intent or
consciousness of doing anything beyond resolving the concrete dispute
before them.
One can make too much of these similarities, however. Without the
openness and transparency crucial to Sturm's model, judicial resolution of
the Field Ox or Irate Husband Cases may make residents aware of the
courts' institutional power, but it cannot create general norms on anything
but the most limited and local scale. Even if we accept Zhu's rather
sanguine view of the procedures of the adjudication committee, its
deliberations are not open and transparent in the sense of or to the same
degree as American courts. Even more importantly, the actions of the
adjudication committee represent only a fraction of informal influences on
judicial decisions.
Nonetheless, the fact that American judges are engaged in roughly
similar fact-sensitive and collaborative adjudications that consciously
depart from the formalist rule-enforcement model opens up an array of
possibilities for reform of Chinese adjudication that do not require the
76. Id. (manuscript at 6).
77. Id.
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creation of a World Bank-style judiciary. Given that the latter is arguably
impossible for China any time soon, a closer look at the practices described
by Sturm and similar practices in other countries and legal areas may
suggest ways in which the basic courts can create general norms while
remaining sensitive and responsive to their local populations.
Such a consultative process might also ameliorate a second problem
inherent in the eventual modernization of the Chinese judiciary: the
unnecessary or premature destruction of local norms. As we have seen,
despite the informality of basic court adjudication, nationally promulgated
rules are not irrelevant. Their presence and the possibility of appeal
influence the way courts resolve disputes even when judges may not have
either the professional training necessary to understand the legal niceties or
the bureaucratic will to apply them. The result is unlikely to be the
inculcation of centralized norms into local society, but the failure to
establish modem norms completely does not mean that the status quo ante
remains in place. Preexisting local practices that contribute to social
stability and facilitate economic relationships may be irreparably harmed.
The judicial interference with the rural practice of dahuo in the Field
Ox Case, for example, may dissuade villagers from using the dahuo form in
the future without providing an effective and widely understood
substitute.78 In other words, the introduction of legal institutions into the
countryside may have the ironic effect of disrupting the social stability that
rule-of-law institutions are intended to achieve. The point is not that law
reforms should aim to preserve local customary practices. There is no
reason to believe that customary practices such as dahuo are necessarily
stable and efficient, and even if they are appropriate for contemporary life
in rural society, they may not remain so for long given the pace of change
in China and the PRC's determination to use legal institutions to extend the
reach of the state. The solution, therefore, may be to institutionalize the
dialectic that Zhu describes between formal and informal, modem and
customary, center and periphery in a manner designed to make the norms
created more accessible to the public while also being respectful of local
practices. With Sturm's portrayal of contemporary discrimination litigation
in the United States as an example, such a step might even be celebrated as
a move toward modernity. Chinese legal scholars could take the place that
78. The displacement of informal practices by the introduction of formal legal institutions has
been amply recognized. See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of
Papua New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 759 (1991); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse
Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform
Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64 (2000); Frank K.
Upham, Speculations on Legal Informality: On Winn's "Relational Practices and the
Marginalization of Law," 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 233 (1994); William P. Alford, Exporting "The
Pursuit of Happiness," 113 HARv. L. REV. 1677, 1706-09 (2000) (reviewing THOMAS
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)).
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Zhu holds for them: not only representing the law of one-fifth of mankind
but also announcing a new model for societies facing rapid change and wide
gaps between urban and rural conditions.
3. Chinese Basic Court Judges and the Bureaucratic Model
A final area where a comparative perspective may provide insight into
both the state of the Chinese judiciary and its relevance for other developing
countries is reforming the courts' bureaucratic nature, particularly the role
of the adjudication committee and the ubiquity of informal collective
adjudication. Zhu's only reference to other judicial bureaucracies is his
dismissal of the American judiciary as too dissimilar to be relevant, but he
might have found something worth studying had he looked to Japan.
The Japanese judiciary is one of the most bureaucratized in the world.
Judges typically enter in their twenties, and lateral entry is rare. The result
is a corps of judges who, with the occasional exception of a year or two
spent in a national ministry, have never done anything else in their entire
working lives. They are members of a finely tuned hierarchy that is tightly
supervised by the Supreme Court Secretariat, with a socialization and
training program that guarantees the professional competence of virtually
every judge sitting in Japan. Not only are all judges monitored and
evaluated constantly, but the Secretariat also uses an intricate system of
promotions and transfers to reward competence and productivity and punish
mistakes and sloth. Add to this mix compensation greater than that of other
public servants and tight restrictions on political activity, and you have an
honest and effective judiciary that should be the envy of most countries in
the First World and an obvious model for countries like China.79
The Japanese model remains attractive even after considering the vast
differences between China and Japan. Chinese basic court judges, as we
have seen, often have minimal legal training and come from a range of
regional and occupational backgrounds, a diverse group by almost any
standard. Japanese judges are the opposite: They are among the most highly
qualified graduates of a few top law faculties, and they come largely from
the same socioeconomic class in perhaps the most homogenous large
country in the world. Although the higher salaries and greater professional
freedom of private practice are increasingly attracting young Japanese
lawyers, the bench remains a highly prestigious and well-paid post. In
contrast, Chinese judges are poorly paid and enjoy little prestige. As Zhu
emphasizes, the chance of a top graduate of Beijing University Law School
going to a rural basic court is infinitesimally small.
Far from being reasons for shunning the Japanese experience, however,
79. See generally JO1N OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998).
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these differences may cut the other way. If the Supreme Court Secretariat
were eliminated tomorrow and Japanese judges freed of its supervision and
personnel manipulation, Japan would still enjoy a highly qualified and
motivated judiciary. The Chinese judiciary, on the other hand, would appear
to need the bureaucratic integrity and professional socialization of the
Secretariat desperately. A tightly run administrative unit engaged in
constant mentoring and monitoring of;junior judges would leverage the
meager supply of technical expertise of the Chinese judiciary, especially at
the lower levels. Zhu might argue that a centralized entity like the
Secretariat would detract from the local knowledge and unconventional
judicial skills necessary at the basic court level, but he would have to admit
that it would enhance the professionalization that he currently leaves to the
adjudication committee. It would also strengthen the ability of the judiciary
to resist external pressure and to prevent corruption within its ranks. In
other words, the development somewhere within the judicial hierarchy of an
oversight and training entity with the power and authority of Japan's
Secretariat would improve the basic courts along precisely the technical
lines in which they are now deficient even in Zhu's estimation.
There are of course many practical obstacles to further bureaucratic
supervision of the Chinese courts. First is resources. Japan is a rich country
that has chosen to limit litigation and provide a wide range of extrajudicial
means to resolve civil disputes. Even relative to population, it has a small
judiciary. China, by contrast, is poor and has chosen to rely increasingly on
the courts for social control, so the amount of resources available will be
substantially smaller relative to the number of courts and judges. But a lack
of resources is only part of the problem. More important is the
decentralization of the Chinese judiciary and its inclusion in local and
provincial bureaucratic structures. One of the less-remarked-on aspects of
the Secretariat is its unifying role, not only in the legal system but in the
nation as well. While there are many reasons to expect that a shift to such a
centralized judiciary would be a dramatic improvement over the current
Chinese judicial structure, it is unlikely to occur in the near future.
But the most important reason to doubt the wisdom of a more
centralized judiciary is politics. Several Japanese and American scholars
have argued that the Japanese judiciary is under the political thumb of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has dominated Japanese
politics since World War II. They claim that the Secretariat not only
controls entry into the judiciary but also punishes any judge who dares to
decide even one case in a manner inimical to the partisan interests of the
LDP.80 The punishment is mild-usually limited to a stunted professional
80. For an overview of the literature on partisan political control of the Japanese judiciary,
see Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese
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career and transfer to a less desirable post-but effective, so that virtually
all observers of the Japanese judiciary agree that judges feel constrained to
decide cases within the range of what is politically acceptable to the
Secretariat.
While perhaps offensive to true believers in judicial independence, this
type of political control does not appear to have had pernicious results in
Japanese society. Japan remains a vigorous and competitive democracy.
Despite LDP dominance, it has never been a one-party state in the
authoritarian sense of that term, and Japanese enjoy the same basic
freedoms to the same general extent as citizens of other industrialized
democracies. Although it has only momentarily been out of power during
this period, the electoral success of the LDP has waxed and waned, and it
has been successful largely because it has been willing to adjust its policies
radically when necessary to remain in power. There have always been, in
other words, strong restraints on what the LDP could politically accomplish
through the courts, and the courts have in several instances ruled against the
LDP in politically charged cases.
Japanese courts exist within a vibrant democracy. That they operate
within political constraints may be regrettable from the standpoint of
judicial independence, but it is hardly reason to fear for the health of
Japanese democracy. A similarly tightly controlled judiciary in China,
however, would present a radically different picture. When viewed through
a political lens, -a centralized bureaucracy and intensified judicial training
seem more ambiguous than when the perspective is limited to professional
competence and honesty. Indeed, if we allow our imaginations to return to
the model represented by the Shihata excerpt above, rule-of-law formalism
takes on a darker tone. Whatever one thinks of the accomplishments and
shortcomings of the Chinese Communist Party, it operates without many if
not most of the political constraints present in democracies. This may not
mean that the Party is all-powerful or would long survive if its policies were
totally arbitrary, but it must certainly give one pause in advocating a unified
judiciary along the lines of the Japanese model, even if that judiciary would
be of much higher quality by standards of technical proficiency and
honesty.
From this perspective, the romanticized, close-to-the-people picture of
basic court judges that Zhu draws has a certain charm. Economists and rule-
of-law reformers may prefer a unified system of stable universal rules
consistently applied across China. Such a system might improve market
function and enrich the country by accelerating Zhu's standardization
process, but in a regime without strong constraints on political power it
might well lead to greater repression and eventually the kind of social
Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming Spring 2005).
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unrest that would quickly destroy the economic gains that economists
assume would flow from a more effective judiciary. If, in other words, basic
court judges stopped being providers of social stability and brakes on the
marketization inherent in Beijing's current policies, the result might not be
exactly as anticipated by those entranced by the rule-bounded nature of
rule-of-law orthodoxy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the distance between the practices of basic court judges and
rule-of-law imagery, Zhu Suli's Sending Law to the Countryside gives us
no reason to doubt those judges' general effectiveness. To the extent that
the Chinese situation is repeated in other developing countries, therefore, it
raises the question of whether legal reforms should aspire to create effective
village judging like Zhu describes or should attempt to leapfrog that stage
and develop a professional judiciary that resembles the one anticipated in
Shihata's memo. The answer depends on a range of factors: whether one
shares Zhu's faith in the formalist model as the ultimate destination of
modem legal systems, one's estimate of the possibility and cost of creating
a rule-of-law judiciary, and whether one thinks a centralizing judiciary will
enhance social stability and political development. Other relevant factors
include the nature and effectiveness of current modes of enforcing
economic exchange and maintaining social order, their compatibility with a
modem legal system, and whether one values dispute resolution or norm
diffusion. A final issue, but perhaps the most important for many reformers,
if not for Zhu, is the political role of the courts. Will they understand local
norms and provide substantive justice to the residents, or will they be
instruments of the center designed to conform local practices and behavior
to national standards and define justice in the interests of faraway rulers?
The resolution of these issues depends on the political goals and
institutional resources of each society, but Sending Law to the Countryside,
its flaws notwithstanding, can shed some light on the nature of the questions
and the range of possible answers.
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